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Article 1

ARTICLES

Successor Liability for Defective
Products: A Redesign Ongoing
Richard L. Cupp, Jr.†
Christopher L. Frost††
As noted by Plutarch, “[T]ime [is] the wisest counselor of
all.”1 It teaches lessons. It also proves predictions—including
predictions about evolution of the law—to be on the mark or
errant. The American Law Institute’s treatment of successor
corporate liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability,2 completed in 1997, relied heavily on predictions in
setting its proposed standard. The Restatement (Third) sought,
among other things, to address the circumstances under which
a successor corporation should be liable for defective products
sold by a predecessor corporation. It made the controversial
prediction that the “continuity of enterprise” and “product line”
approaches (hereafter sometimes referred to as “the less
restrictive approaches”) to determining the liability of
successor corporations for products liability claims are dead to
growth, and it asserted that these approaches have been
rejected by “a substantial majority of courts.”3

†
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1
1 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 218 (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John
Dryden trans., Random House 2001).
2
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1997).
3
Id. § 12 cmt. b, Reporters’ Notes (“[A]fter an early spurt of cases in the late
1970s and early 1980s arguing for more expansive liability, courts have refused to
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The nine years that have followed the Restatement
(Third)’s predictions about successor products liability have not
been kind to them. Rather than a substantial majority
rejecting the less restrictive approaches, courts that have
firmly taken a position are in reality quite divided regarding an
appropriate approach.4 The judicial landscape on this issue
remains varied, with some courts recently adopting one or both
of the less restrictive approaches, some courts recently
adopting the more restrictive “traditional approach,” and some
courts remaining undecided regarding an appropriate
approach.
The Restatement (Third) supports the traditional
approach to corporate successor liability for products liability
claims. The traditional approach provides that an injured
consumer cannot sue the successor unless one of the following
exceptions applies:
(1) The successor’s acquisition of the predecessor was accompanied
by an agreement for the successor to assume such liability;
(2) the acquisition resulted from a fraudulent conveyance to escape
liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor;
(3) the acquisition constituted a continuation or merger with the
predecessor; or
(4) the acquisition resulted in the successor becoming a mere
continuation of the predecessor.5

Critics assert that the traditional approach’s
restrictiveness inappropriately shifts risk from the corporation
to the consumer, who is much less able to bear that risk.6
Numerous courts have adopted the less restrictive continuity of
enterprise approach and/or the product line approach in
response to that concern.
impose liability unless the plaintiff is able to come within the four traditional
exceptions.”).
4
See infra notes 35-125.
5
See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999).
6
See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding
the policy reasons underlying strict liability of a manufacturer applicable to cases
involving successor corporations); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825
(N.J. 1981) (holding that the social policy of products liability warrants expansion of
the traditional corporate rule); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Cal. 1977) (justifying
expansion of successor liability on the basis of strict liability principles); Turner v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976) (stating that strict liability
principles should govern over those of corporate law).
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The continuity of enterprise approach imposes liability
on a successor corporation if the court concludes that the
successor is sufficiently similar to the predecessor that it is in
essence continuing the predecessor’s enterprise. In making
this determination, courts look to a broad range of factors,
including whether there is continuity of management,
personnel, assets, facilities, and operations;7 whether the
predecessor dissolves as soon as practicable after the sale;8
whether the business enterprise continues uninterrupted by
the transfer;9 and whether the successor holds itself out to the
consuming public as a continuing enterprise.10 Continuity of
shareholders is an important factor under the continuity of
enterprise approach, but courts may find a continuing
enterprise even when the predecessor’s assets were sold to new
shareholders,11 and even when the assets were sold for cash
rather than for stock in the successor corporation.12 The
continuity of enterprise approach does not require that the
7

See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
See id. at 884.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate
Successorship in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375 (1996) (stating that
while the mere continuation exception requires a continuity of shareholders, ‘continuity
of enterprise’ focuses on a basic continuity of the business); Michael D. Green,
Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability
Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 25 (1986) (stating that courts using the expanded
continuation approach can find liability although there was a change in ownership);
Howard L. Shecter, Selected Risk Issues in Merger and Acquisition Transactions, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 719, 725 (1997) (explaining that ‘continuity of enterprise’ has its roots in
the mere continuation exception); Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a
Successor Corporation’s Liability for its Predecessor’s Defective Products when the
Successor has Acquired the Predecessor’s Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 824-27
(1988) (discussing the expansion of the mere continuation and de facto merger
exceptions through case law).
12
A sale of assets for cash will not transfer liability under the traditional
approach absent an agreement to assume such liability or a fraudulent conveyance.
See Murphy, supra note 11, at 817-18. For a successor corporation to be held liable
under either the de facto merger or mere continuation exceptions to the traditional
rule, the shareholders of both entities must be the same. See id. at 819-21. In the case
of a de facto merger, the successor corporation must acquire its predecessor’s assets
with shares of its own stock. See id. at 819; see also Pancrantz v. Monsanto Co., 547
N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1996) (holding successor corporation not liable as mere
continuation where there was no evidence of continuity of shareholders); Harris v. T.I.,
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 1992) (same); Green, supra note 11, at 23 (noting that
courts that have expanded successor liability have eliminated the stock for
consideration requirement of de facto merger and mere continuation exceptions);
Michael D. Kristofco, Comment, Successor Liability: The Debate over the Continuity of
Enterprise Exception in Ohio is Really No Debate at All, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 297, 301
(1994) (listing continuity of shareholders as one of four factors necessary for a de facto
merger).
8
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successor continue selling the same product line as the
predecessor, although selling the same product line is a factor
that supports finding a continuing enterprise.13
The product line approach imposes liability when the
successor continues to market a product line previously sold by
the predecessor.14 It differs from the continuity of enterprise
approach by not requiring that the successor purchase the
predecessor business as a going concern for liability to attach.
Instead, it requires that the successor continue selling a
product line sold by the predecessor.15
It is these two approaches that the Restatement (Third)
in 1997 labeled “unfair and socially wasteful,” and dismissed as
a “small minority” that is the subject of “overwhelming judicial
rejection.” 16

13
See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting
that a successor corporation may still be liable under a ‘continuity of enterprise’
exception if it continues some, but not all, of the manufacturing activities of its
predecessor); George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A
Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 704 (1983) (distinguishing the continuity of enterprise
approach from product line rule on the basis that under the former, a successor may be
held liable where it did not continue the product line, but merely “uses the
predecessor’s name or trademark”).
14
See Dick Hoffman, Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A
Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 357 (1978) (tracing notable cases from
the 1970s leading to the expansion of corporate successor liability); Roberta L.
Schuhalter, Note, Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Tort Exception to a
Corporate Rule, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831, 846-47 & nn.130-46 (1982) (same); see also
Carol A. Rogala, Comment, Nontraditional Successor Product Liability: Should Society
Be Forced to Pay the Cost?, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 37, 49-50 (1990) (“‘[A] party which
acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products . . . assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line
previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was
acquired.’” (quoting Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977))); Shecter, supra note
11, at 726 (same).
15
See, e.g., Dorit F. Kressel, Successor Liability in Products Liability
Litigation: Modern Judicial Response to Traditional Corporate Rules, 4 PROD. LIAB.
L.J. 211, 221 (1993) (explaining that the method of the corporate acquisition is not
relevant under the product line exception); Murphy, supra note 11, at 844 (stating that
the product line exception disregards the business aspects of an acquisition, instead
focusing on whether the successor continues output of the same product line); Mike
Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 78 (1998)
(explaining that under the product line exception, liability will attach regardless of how
the predecessor was acquired). But see, e.g., Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 124-25 (Ct. App. 1979) (imposing liability under the product line exception
although the successor did not continue identical product line); Pacius v. Thermtroll
Corp., 611 A.2d 15, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (holding the successor
corporation liable under the product line exception where it did not continue to
manufacture the product line).
16
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 & cmt. b, Reporters’
Notes (1997).

2007]

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

1177

In 1999, one of this article’s authors tested the
Restatement (Third)’s pronouncements in a law review article
The article
entitled Redesigning Successor Liability.17
examined the frequency of, and purpose behind, courts’
application of the traditional versus less restrictive approaches
to corporate successor liability in products liability cases.
Redesigning Successor Liability revealed that the less
restrictive approaches are not subject to “overwhelming judicial
rejection,” nor are they even a “small minority.” To the
contrary, as of 1999, eighteen states had adopted the
traditional approach,18 and thirteen had adopted the continuity
of enterprise approach19 or the product line approach.20
17

Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. Rev.

845 (1999).
18
See id. at 853 & n.41. The count included states that adopted the
traditional approach through either state supreme court decisions, lower court
decisions, or federal court decisions attempting to apply state law. The eighteen states
applying the traditional approach at that time include Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619, 622-24 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)); Colorado
(Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)); Florida
(Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 1982)); Illinois (Nilsson v. Cont’l
Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Iowa (Pancratz v.
Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky (Conn v. Fales Div. of
Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Kentucky law));
Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 1991)); Minnesota (Niccum v.
Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 97 (Minn. 1989)); Missouri (Chem. Design, Inc. v.
Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)); Nebraska (Jones v.
Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982)); North Carolina (Budd
Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)); North Dakota
(Downtowner v. Acrometal Prods., 347 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (N.D. 1984)); Oklahoma
(Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977)); Texas (Mudgett v. Paxson
Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); Vermont (Ostrowski v. HydraTool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984)); Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605,
609-10 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 563 (W. Va.
1992)); and Wisconsin (Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 821, 829 (Wis.
1985)).
19
States following the continuity of enterprise approach at that time
included Alabama (Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 599-600 (Ala. 1995));
Michigan (Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976));
Mississippi (Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying Mississippi law)); New Hampshire (Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145,
1152-54 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law)); Ohio (Flaugher v. Cone
Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987)); and South Carolina (Holloway
v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying South
Carolina law)).
20
States following the product line approach at that time included California
(Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977)); Connecticut (Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co.,
No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *7, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996);
Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995); Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1992)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431
A.2d 811, 817 (N.J. 1981)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50
(N.M. 1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa.
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Demographically, the eighteen states that had adopted the
traditional approach represented only thirty-eight percent of
the United States population,21 while forty-three percent of the
population resided in the thirteen states that had adopted one
of the less restrictive approaches.22 Despite the Restatement
(Third)’s death pronouncement, the less restrictive approaches
were likely being applied in more lawsuits than was the
traditional approach.23
Redesigning Successor Liability also rejected the
Restatement (Third)’s assertion that the less restrictive
approaches are socially wasteful and unfair. Redesigning
Successor Liability argued, to the contrary, that the continuity
of enterprise and product line approaches more effectively
channel responsibility for products liability back to the
predecessor corporation than does the traditional approach
because they force successor corporations to consider the
projected cost of the predecessor’s products liability at the time
The article
the successor purchases the predecessor.24
suggested that successor corporations often could minimize
their risks by purchasing relatively inexpensive insurance.25 It
further advocated that the less restrictive approaches are more
fair and efficient because successor corporations are more able
to predict, prevent, or absorb a loss due to a defective product.26
In 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court embraced much of
Redesigning Successor Liability’s analysis in adopting the

Super. Ct. 1981)); and Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash.
1984)). New York courts at the time held the successor liable if it sold the same
product line sold by the predecessor or if it fell within the continuity of enterprise
approach. See, e.g., McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 89-3910, 1992 WL
266923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992) (suggesting that New York has accepted
continuity of enterprise); Rothstein v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220-21
(Sup. Ct. 1997) (adopting the product line exception); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food &
Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting continuity of
enterprise). For a discussion of New York’s current approach, see infra notes 99-114
and accompanying text.
21
Approximately 100 million people reside in the eighteen states following
the traditional approach. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. 28 (1997), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract1995_2000.html (Population Table No. 26).
22
Of the 265 million people residing in the United States as of 1996, 113
million lived in the thirteen states following one of the less restrictive approaches. See
id.
23
See Cupp, supra note 17, at 856 & n.70.
24
See id. at 845.
25
See id. at 867.
26
See id.
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continuity of enterprise approach.27 Referring to the article’s
“channeling back” argument, the court reasoned that the
continuity of enterprise approach would “have the effect of
encouraging existing corporations to produce safer products, in
keeping with the public policy goals that underlie product
liability law generally.”28 The court agreed that firms can
protect themselves by negotiating a rational purchase price
that reflects the potential successor liabilities, and by
purchasing insurance where appropriate.29
Thoughtful academic debate has followed the article’s
publication. In 2002, University of Chicago Professor Richard
Epstein published a law review article expressing concern that
adoption of the less restrictive approaches may not in fact
“channel back” responsibility as asserted by Redesigning
Successor Liability, but may instead lead corporations to
liquidate or sell off assets piecemeal rather than sell to
successors. According to Professor Epstein:
What is overlooked in Professor Cupp’s channeling argument is the
possibility that the increased liability will result in scrubbing the
transaction. . . . One possible way to defeat all products liability
claims against successors is through a piecemeal disposition of the
company. Astute corporate owners could decide to sell off bits and
pieces of the assets to different buyers, engage in partial liquidations
or dividends to current shareholders, and then finally liquidate the
rest.30

University of South Carolina Professor Marie T. Reilly
agreed with Epstein’s concerns in a 2003 law review article,
opining that “Cupp’s model of the transferee as the least cost
insurer of creditors’ loss misses an important limitation on the
transferee’s capacity to channel or internalize creditors’ risk of
loss to the debtor.”31 Both Epstein and Reilly also questioned
Redesigning Successor Liability’s assessment of insurance
availability, arguing in effect that in cases of unknowable
claims, insurance is not a realistic option, so the monetary
burden will simply be shifted onto the transferee corporation.32
27
See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55 nn.26 & 28, 56
n.35, 57 nn.40 & 42, 58 nn.49 & 53-55 (Alaska 2001).
28
Id. at 58 n.49.
29
Id. at 57.
30
Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual and Corporate
Issues, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (2002).
31
Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
745, 790 (2003).
32
See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
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This article addresses those responses and re-tests
Redesigning Successor Liability’s original theories and
arguments. Part I discusses courts’ rulings on successor
liability since the publication of Redesigning Successor
Liability. The part provides an updated analysis of states’
current positions on successor liability and concludes that,
contrary to the Restatement (Third)’s death predictions, courts
continue to be split regarding the less restrictive approaches.
Some jurisdictions are newly adopting them, and others are
newly rejecting them.
Part II re-visits Redesigning Successor Liability’s
original arguments regarding the efficacy of the less restrictive
approaches, and responds to the arguments’ critics. The part
discusses how the primary criticism leveled—that the less
restrictive approaches unfairly impute liability where the risks
were unknowable—appears to be flawed. As recognized in the
Restatement (Third), courts generally decline to assign liability
based on imputed knowledge in products liability cases.33
Indeed, the scholars who developed the theory of imputed
knowledge of risks in strict liability—Dean John Wade and
Dean Page Keeton—later in their careers both repudiated their
creation.34 This part also discusses how, in any event, truly
unknowable risks are rare. Part III concludes that the
continuity of enterprise and product line theories are neither
dead to growth nor the subject of overwhelming judicial

33
See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (“While
some decisions apply strict liability principles to such a [failure to warn] defect by
holding that it is irrelevant whether the manufacturer knew of the danger or should
have known, . . . most jurisdictions hold to the contrary. That is, liability is conditioned
on the actual or constructive knowledge of the risk by the manufacturer as of the time
the product was sold or distributed.”); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810
P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1987) (“[W]e hereby adopt the requirement, as propounded by the
Restatement Second of Torts and acknowledged by the lower courts of this state and
the majority of jurisdictions, that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict
liability for failure to warn.”). But see Johnson v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d
548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (“It is clear, therefore, that in a strict products liability action,
the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers
inherent in his or her product is irrelevant to the issue of liability.”); Sternhagen v.
Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (holding that “knowledge of any
undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the manufacturer,”
although recognizing that a number of jurisdictions have held otherwise).
34
See W. Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law—A
Review of Basic Principles, 45 MO. L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1980); John W. Wade, On the
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 734, 764 (1983) (“I now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any
particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language.”).
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rejection, and that despite critics’ concerns, these approaches
continue to promote sound public policy.
I.

A REDESIGN ONGOING: CONTINUING DIVISION IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM

A.

Jurisdictions Recently Adopting One or Both of the Less
Restrictive Approaches

Contrary to the Restatement (Third)’s predictions, the
new millennium has seen no developing consensus on
approaches to successor products liability. Some jurisdictions
taking a clear position on the issue for the first time in the new
millennium have adopted one or both of the less restrictive
approaches. For example, in 2001, four years after the
Restatement (Third) pronounced the product line and
continuity of enterprise approaches dead to growth, the Alaska
Supreme Court in Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply
Co. adopted and firmly supported the continuity of enterprise
approach.35
Savage Arms involved a lawsuit against the successor to
the manufacturer of a defective rifle. Jack Taylor sued Savage
Industries after Taylor’s son was injured by a defective rifle
Taylor later
originally manufactured by the company.36
amended the suit to add Western Auto Supply Company, which
had bought the rifle and sold it to a retail store in Maine.37
Western Auto then brought a third-party claim for indemnity
against Savage Arms, Inc., a corporation that had purchased
assets of Savage Industries.38 After Western Auto settled with
Taylor, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Western Auto against Savage Arms, “holding Savage Arms
liable as ‘the legal successor to Savage Industries, Inc.’”39
Savage Arms petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for
review.40 The court granted the petition and framed the issue
as follows: whether “a corporation that purchases assets of the
manufacturer of a rifle sold in Alaska [could] be held liable for

35
18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2001) (“We therefore adopt the ‘continuity of
enterprise’ exception to the general rule of nonliability for corporate successors.”).
36
Id. at 51.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 52.
40
Id.

1182

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

personal injury caused in Alaska by a defect in the rifle?”41 In
addressing this issue, the Alaska Supreme Court formally
adopted the continuity of enterprise approach to successor
liability.42
The court referred extensively to Redesigning Successor
Liability in adopting the approach, citing it seven times in a
nine page opinion.43 Referencing the article, the court reasoned
that the continuity of enterprise approach encourages “existing
corporations to produce safer products.”44 The court also
adopted the article’s reasoning that the approach “will give
manufacturing corporations additional incentives to market
non-defective products, in order to maximize the corporations’
market value in event of sale.”45
Again citing to Redesigning Successor Liability, the
court debunked the potential counterargument that the
continuity of enterprise approach would “discourage large-scale
transfers so long as anticipated successor liabilities do not
exceed the value of the corporation’s accumulated goodwill.”46
Instead, the court concluded that the purchasing corporation
will merely take the potential liability into account in
determining purchase price and insurance coverage.47 The
court also rejected the Restatement (Third)’s assumption that
the continuity of enterprise approach results in a windfall for
claimants, noting that recovery for legitimate injuries is not a
windfall.48 Finally, the court discounted the argument that
successor liability conflicts with maximizing bankruptcy
estates, reasoning that bankruptcy creditors do not deserve
priority over injured tort claimants.49 Although the court
ultimately reversed the summary judgment order and
remanded the case to the trial court, it did so to allow the trial
court to consider “the ‘mere continuation’ and ‘continuity of
enterprise’ exceptions in the context of this case.”50

41

Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 52.
Id. at 55.
43
Id. at 55 n.26, 57 nn.40 & 42, 58 nn.49 & 53-55.
44
Id. at 58.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 56-57.
47
Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 57-58.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 57.
50
Id. at 58 (an additional reason for the court’s reversal was the existence of
unresolved factual issues).
42
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The Alaska Supreme Court addressed the product line
approach in the same opinion.51 Although the court declined to
reach the issue of whether it would adopt the product line
approach due to the particular facts of the case before it, the
court left that door open: “Our decision today does not preclude
further consideration of this [product line] exception in an
appropriate case.”52
The continuity of enterprise approach appears likely to
remain the law for some time in Alaska. In 2002, Alaska
Attorney General Bruce Botelho wrote an opinion letter to
Alaska Governor Tony Knowles regarding a legislative bill
designed “to reject the continuity of enterprise exception to the
doctrine of successor liability adopted in [Savage Arms].”53
Attorney General Botelho recommended that the bill be
vetoed.54 The Attorney General’s opinion cited, among other
things, the legitimacy of the Savage Arms opinion, and the
interest in maintaining a remedy for injured plaintiffs:
From a policy perspective, we think that the balance established by
the Savage Arms court is more appropriate than that established by
the Products Liability Restatement as codified in the bill. We think
that the modest expansion of the scope of successor liability
announced by the Savage Arms court was a legitimate decision by
the court and do not think it should be disturbed. This decision will
help to ensure that injured plaintiffs have a viable remedy when
companies that sold defective products sell their assets and
liquidate.55

Ultimately, the bill attacking Savage Arms did not pass, and
the continuity of enterprise approach remains good law in
Alaska.56
In 2001, the same year Alaska adopted the continuity of
enterprise approach, Mississippi adopted the product line
approach to successor liability.57 In Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc.,
Huff filed suit against Shopsmith, among others, for injuries
she suffered due to an allegedly defective “Mark V” power
51

Id. at 55.
Id. at 55 n.25.
53
Letter from Bruce M. Botelho, Alaska Attorney Gen., to Tony Knowles,
Governor of Alaska (June 11, 2002), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/
opinions/883020095.pdf.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
The bill appears to have died in the House Judiciary Committee. See H.B.
13, 23d Leg., 1st Sess (Alaska 2003).
57
Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001) (“[W]e view the
product line theory as a viable basis for recovery.”).
52
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tool.58 Huff alleged that Shopsmith was liable as the successor
After summary
corporation of the tool’s manufacturer.59
60
judgment was entered in favor of Shopsmith, Huff urged the
Mississippi Supreme Court on appeal to adopt the product line
approach.61 Ultimately, the court viewed the product line
theory as a viable basis for recovery.62 As to Huff’s claim,
however, the court recognized that the facts of the particular
case did not meet the product line approach’s requirements.63
Two years later, in Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost Dev.,
Inc., the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the product line
approach is premised on: (1) the successor corporation’s
superior position to assume the obligation of risk-spreading,
and (2) “the idea of estoppel and principles of fairness that a
corporation that benefits from the goodwill of a predecessor’s
product should also bear the burden of liabilities attached to
the product as well.”64 In that same 2003 opinion, the court
adopted the continuity of enterprise approach, not in the
context of products liability, but rather with respect to “debts
owed by the predecessor when the successor takes on the
identity of the predecessor company in every way except taking
responsibility for the predecessor’s debts.”65 The court did not
dispute, however, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the
continuity of enterprise approach in Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.
Corp., a products liability case involving Mississippi law.66
Indeed, Paradise Corp. cites to the Mozingo opinion for law on
corporate successor liability, including the continuity of
enterprise approach.67
Although no Connecticut appellate courts have yet ruled
on the issue, a Connecticut Superior Court in 1999 adopted the
product line approach in the context of a successor products
liability claim arising from injuries sustained from a fall from
58

Id. at 385.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 387.
62
Id. at 388.
63
Huff, 786 So. 2d at 388.
64
848 So. 2d 177, 180 (Miss. 2003) (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752
F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985)).
65
Id. at 180-81.
66
See 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing a lack of clear
authority from Mississippi on corporate successor liability, but holding that the district
court did not err by instructing the jury on continuity of enterprise).
67
See Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 179-80 (citing Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 17475)).
59

2007]

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

1185

an allegedly defective ladder.68 In Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck
Racks, Inc., the court, in the context of an appeal from the
granting of a motion for summary judgment, addressed
whether a successor corporation could be held liable when it
neither manufactured nor sold an allegedly defective ladder.69
In finding that the successor corporation could be held
liable despite having neither manufactured nor sold the
ladder,70 the court adopted the product line approach but
remanded in order to determine whether the requirements of
this approach had been satisfied.71 The court reasoned that, as
a policy matter, successor liability “is a continuation of the
basic principle that between an injured consumer and a
business entity the latter is best able to absorb and to pass off
to, the body of customers, the general public, through pricing,
the cost of personal injury sustained by ordinary citizens.”72
Otherwise, “the injured party has no defense to the risk of noncompensation from a voluntarily defunct seller.”73
The Savage Arms, Huff, and Pastorick opinions
demonstrate that in the new millennium the product line and
continuity of enterprise approaches are neither dead to growth
nor the subject of overwhelming judicial rejection. On the

68
Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL
608674, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished). Three Connecticut lower
courts had already adopted the same approach. See Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV
920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *7-8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug 5, 1996); Kennedy v.
Oshkosh Truck Corp., No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 18, 1995); Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Aug. 25, 1992). At least one other Connecticut Superior Court has recognized the
product line approach without explicitly adopting it. See Sizer v. Goss Int’l, No.
CV030825035, 2005 WL 1023244 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31. 2005) (“Connecticut
courts have recognized, however, an exception to the general rule referred to as the
‘product line continuation’ exception to successor liability.”).
69
Pastorick, 1999 WL 608674 at *1.
70
Id. (“The defendant moves for summary judgment. Its position is that it did
not sell the product nor did it manufacturer the product. There appears to be no
controversy as to manufacture and sale, as the complaint clearly reveals that the
manufacturer and original seller was A.W. Flint Company.”).
71
Id. at *1-2 (“Although no Connecticut appeals court has specifically dealt
with the ‘product line continuation’ avenue of liability, this court is of the opinion that
there is a sound legal basis for the application of the product line continuation theory of
liability in this State. . . . It is not clear as to whether the defendant continued to
produce the same product line as did the Flint Company.”).
72
Id. at *2.
73
Id. at *3.
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contrary, courts continue to adopt74 and apply75 the less
restrictive approaches to successor liability cases.
Other courts also may be headed that direction, but
have not yet committed. For example, an Indiana appellate
court addressed the pros and cons of the product line approach
in Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co.76 The court went so far as to
state that “[t]he product line exception may be an appropriate
means by which to balance the seemingly juxtaposed concepts
of strict liability under the Indiana Product Liability Act, and
freedom of contract—long supported by common law, as well as
both state and federal constitutions.”77 However, the court
stopped short of adopting the product line approach because
the specific factual circumstances before the court did not
justify imposition of successor liability.78 Tellingly, at least one
Indiana court has since cited Guerrero for the proposition that
“Indiana recognizes the product line successor theory of
liability in products liability cases under certain
circumstances.”79 Professor George Kuney recently predicted
that “[b]ased on the Guerrero court’s favorable treatment of the
product line exception, the Indiana Court of Appeals probably
will adopt the product line exception when it is presented with
the appropriate factual record.”80
South Dakota is another example of a jurisdiction that
may at some point move toward the less restrictive approaches.
In a non-products liability case, in which the court analyzed
only one of the traditional approaches to successor liability, the
South Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that successor
liability in products liability cases had expanded, and noted the
reasons why this expansion had occurred:
74

See Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001); Savage
Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2000); Pastorick, 1999 WL
608674, at *2.
75
The last six years have seen various courts that had previously adopted the
“continuity of enterprise” or “product line” approach continue to acknowledge or apply
one or both of these less restrictive approaches. See, e.g., Dillman v. Indiana Rolls,
Inc., 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 294, 301 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (“The foregoing facts, as well as the
entire record developed in this case, clearly bring Park squarely within the product line
exception.”).
76
725 N.E.2d 479, 483-87 (Ind. App. 2000).
77
Id. at 487.
78
Id.
79
P.R. Mallory & Co., v. American States Ins. Co., No. 54C01-0005-CP00156, 2004 WL 1737489, at *6 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Jul. 29, 2004).
80
George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6
FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 97), available at
http://www.corpgovcenter.org/Research2006/SuccessKun2006.pdf.

2007]

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

1187

All these exceptions . . . have, however, undergone some expansion
under the law of products liability. Strict liability in tort for
defective products applies regardless of negligence or privity.
Liability for defective products rests on the need to compensate
eligible plaintiffs; thus, the burden of economic loss is shifted not
just to the manufacturer of the defective product, but also at times to
the successor manufacturer who by purchasing assets from the
predecessor is able to continue making the same or similar
products.81

Georgia may also be a candidate for formally adopting
one of the less restrictive approaches.
Professor Kuney
recently described a 1998 Georgia case not included in
Redesigning Successor Liability’s jurisdiction count as evidence
that Georgia has “implicitly accepted the product line
exception.”82 Finally, in 2001, a federal district court hinted
81
Parker v. Western Dakota Insurors, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 181, 185 (S.D. 2000).
The Parker case was one involving a contract dispute, so the court did not have the
opportunity to rule on the viability of the less restrictive approaches in a products
liability context. See id. (“Yet, these strict liability concepts created for the protection
of injured persons do not have the same expansive application in a purely contractual
dispute. In this case, we deal only with the interpretation of contracts to decide
whether by purchasing assets Western Dakota became responsible for First American’s
liability to its employee.”).
82
Kuney, supra note 80 (manuscript at 90). Professor Kuney’s article
provides a laudably thorough state-by-state analysis of general (i.e., not segregating
products liability cases in his analysis) successor liability rulings. Although his
interpretations of state’s positions are in most instances supportive of the count
developed in this article and in Redesigning Successor Liability, with a few cases the
interpretations differ. For example, Professor Kuney follows the Restatement (Third)
in counting Massachusetts and Ohio as jurisdictions following the traditional approach,
whereas this article counts them as jurisdictions that have not firmly committed to any
particular approach. These jurisdictions’ approaches are discussed in Redesigning
Successor Liability as follows:

Regarding Massachusetts, the Restatement (Third) cites Guzman v.
MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1991), as adopting the traditional
approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 12 cmt. c.
Reporters’ Notes (1997), Reporters’ Notes. However, Guzman only rejected
the product line approach, 567 N.E.2d at 929-30, and did not address the
continuity of enterprise approach. In McCarthy v. Litton Industries Inc., 570
N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Mass. 1991), a later case not cited by the Restatement
(Third), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court discussed the continuity
of enterprise approach, but stated that the facts before the court did not
require it to adopt or reject the approach.
Regarding Ohio, the Restatement (Third) cites Welco Industries Inc. v.
Applied Co., 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993), as adopting the traditional
approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 cmt. c, Reporters’ Notes. However,
in Welco, the Ohio Supreme Court actually appears receptive to use of the
continuity of enterprise approach in products liability cases. See 617 N.E.2d
at 1133 (“However valid the justifications for expanding the liability of
successor corporations in products liability cases, [they] do not apply here.”).
The court noted that the facts before it in Welco did not involve products
liability, and the court rejected use of the continuity of enterprise approach in
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that Nevada may follow California’s lead on issues regarding
successor liability (which presumably would include adoption of
the product line approach, although the approach was not
discussed in the opinion).83 In 2005, the Nevada Supreme
Court, in a non-products liability negligence case, expressly left
open the question of whether it would adopt the continuity of
enterprise approach in a products liability case.84 However, the
decision, Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Laboratories,
expressed some concern about potential expansion.85 It cited a
California case that referred to a 1998 Practicing Law Institute
article arguing that the trend was against expansion.86 As
demonstrated in Redesigning Successor Liability a year later,
in 1999, in reality there has not been a trend against expansion
in cases involving products liability claims.87
This confusion about trend directions may result to
some extent from analyses combining product liability cases
and cases not involving products issues. Obviously the product
line approach would not be nearly as compelling in successor
liability cases not involving defective products, and thus
combining products liability cases and other successor liability
cases adds a number of situations in which one of the two
major expansive approaches is not generally even considered,
much less rejected. Further, products liability cases have
aspects that may make the less restrictive approaches more
breach of contract cases as opposed to products liability cases. See id. In an
earlier case, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the product line approach in a
products liability case, but appeared receptive to the continuity of enterprise
approach. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 336-37
(Ohio 1987) (discussing continuity of enterprise, but finding it not applicable
under the facts of the case). In 1992, an Ohio court interpreted Flaugher as
having adopted the continuity of enterprise approach. See Davis v. Loopco
Indus., No. 59594, 1992 WL 2590, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1992)
(“We . . . find that the Flaugher court adopted the expanded test.”).
Cupp, supra note 17, at 853 n.42.
83
Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (D. Nev. 2001) (“In Nevada
the State Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the issue of successor
liability. It is reasonable to expect, however, that in a torts case the Nevada Supreme
Court would follow the lead of the California Supreme Court on this issue, because in
the area of products liability the Nevada Court has adopted nearly every holding of the
California Court.”).
84
Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082, 1091 (Nev.
2005).
85
Id.
86
Id. (quoting Monarch Bay II v. Prof’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d
778, 781 (1999), which cites Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset Aquisitions in
Acquiring or Selling the Privately Held Company, PRAC. L. INST. 77, 99, 101 (1998)).
87
See Cupp, supra note 17, at 852-58.
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attractive to some jurisdictions than they are in non-products
cases—for example, liability without fault is typically extended
to products cases but not to most other types of cases that may
involve successor liability.
In addition to new jurisdictions explicitly adopting or
favorably citing one or both of the less restrictive approaches to
successor liability, the last six years have seen at least one
court applying a continuity of enterprise approach, but
disguised under the name of the more traditional “mere
continuation” theory.88 In Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings,
Inc., a Missouri appellate court recognized that “identity of the
officers, directors, and shareholders for both corporations
(although a substantial factor) is not a precursor to invocation
However, in
of the ‘corporate continuation’ doctrine.”89
concluding that the successor corporation was a corporate
continuation of the predecessor, the Missouri court looked to
factors sounding more in “continuity of enterprise,” including,
among other things, the fact that the successor “continued the
exact same business using the same equipment and had the
same customers as [the predecessor], but never notified them of
the change, utilized the same trade name . . . took over the
works in progress of [the predecessor], collected the accounts
receivable, operated in the same location, and had the same
phone number as [the predecessor].”90
Tellingly, the Roper court held that a lack of continuity
of ownership is not necessary to a finding of “mere
continuation,” despite the fact that the lack of continuity of
ownership is what classically differentiates the continuity of
enterprise approach from the “mere continuation” theory.91 By
88

Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App.

2001).
89

Id. at 712.
Id. at 713.
91
See, e.g., Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1046 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (“The focus of the continuity of enterprise exception is to expand the
traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception that is part of the general rule. The
traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception applies ‘only when there is a common identity
of officers, directors and stock between the selling and purchasing corporations, and
only one corporation after the transfer.’”); Pancrantz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198,
201 (Iowa 1996) (“Under the expanded approach to the mere continuation exception,
the focus is on the continuity of the seller’s business operation and not the continuity of
its management and ownership.”); see also Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 251 621
N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize the “mere continuation”
approach where no continuity of ownership, including continuity of stock ownership
existed). Other jurisdictions requiring continuity of shareholders for application of the
“mere continuation” approach include Colorado (CMCB Enter. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90
90
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looking instead to factors such as the continuing business
operations, the Missouri court has, in essence, adopted a
continuity of enterprise theory. This may not come as a
surprise, as other courts have recognized the potential among
courts to take such an approach. As stated by the Third Circuit
in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., “One may retain the
traditional exceptions but expand their boundaries, so that
‘merger’ or ‘continuation’ are held to include cases they once
would not have included.”92
Although Roper is not a products liability case, but
rather a suit for payment of services, the court did not limit the
holding to service contract cases.93 The court even relied on a
successor products liability case to support its holding.94 That
products liability case, Ray v. Alad Corp., is the case most
commonly cited as spawning one of the less restrictive
approaches, the product line approach.95
Whether
Missouri
will
ultimately
follow
its
pronouncements in Roper in a products liability context
remains to be seen. For now, the authors do not count Missouri
(Colo. 2005) (“The mere continuation exception applies when there is a continuation of
directors, management, and shareholder interest and, in some cases, inadequate
consideration.”)); Illinois (Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1176 (Ill. 1997) (“[T]he
majority of courts considering this exception emphasize a common identity of officers,
directors, and stock between the selling and purchasing corporation as the key element
of a ‘continuation.’”) (quoting Tucker v. Paxton Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th
Cir. 1981))); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg., Inc., 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997)
(“Generally, a continuation of the transferor corporation occurs where there is (1) a
continuity of directors, officers, and shareholders; (2) continued existence of only one
corporation after sale of the assets; and (3) inadequate consideration for the sale of the
assets.”)); Ohio (McGaw v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (“An
asset purchase is subject to the legal consequences of a merger under the de facto
merger exception if: (1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller in terms of
continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and operations; (2)
there is a continuity of shareholders, accomplished by payment for the assets with
shares of stock; (3) the seller ceases operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as
legally and practically possible; and (4) the purchasing corporation assumes the
obligations of the seller necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of business
operations.”)); and Utah (Decius v. Action Collection Svc., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 959 (Utah
Ct. App. 2004) (noting in an employment discrimination case that “the ‘mere
continuation,’ considers not whether the ‘business operations’ continued, but whether
the ‘corporate entity’ continued. . . . A continuation demands ‘a common identity of
stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one corporation at the
completion of the transfer’”)).
92
Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1985)
(negligence and nuisance environmental cleanup lawsuit).
93
See, e.g., Roper, 60 S.W.3d at 712.
94
Id. (citing Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)).
95
See Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (recognizing that the product line approach was “first espoused by the California
Supreme Court in Ray”).
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as having adopted the continuity of enterprise approach. Time
will tell, however, if Missouri continues to reject the continuity
of enterprise by name, but applies it in principle through an
expanded “mere continuation” test. Time will also tell if other
courts follow suit.96
As addressed below, New York recently rejected the
product line approach.97 However, a New York court also
recently hinted at overlap between the traditional approach
and the less restrictive continuity of enterprise approach. In
the case In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litigation, a New
York Supreme Court noted: “Assuming that the exception,
under Schumacher, pertaining to merger and consolidation
would encompass ‘de facto merger,’ and further that there is no
one factor, including continuity of ownership, which is
determinative on that issue, there is very little, if any,
distinction between the exceptions of ‘continuity of enterprise’
and consolidation and merger.”98
B.

Jurisdictions Recently Rejecting One or More of the Less
Restrictive Approaches

Although not all courts addressing the issue of corporate
successor liability in the last six years have adopted the
continuity of enterprise or products line approaches, those
courts for the first time rejecting either of these approaches in
favor of the traditional approach in products liability cases
have been few. The most prominent of the few jurisdictions
rejecting one of the less restrictive successor liability
approaches for the first time in the new millennium is New
York. In Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., the Court of
Appeals of New York expressly declined to address the viability
of the continuity of enterprise approach under the facts of the
case at hand, but it rejected the product line approach.99
96

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently certified
to the Utah Supreme Court the questions of whether the product line and/or continuity
of enterprise approaches apply in Utah. Tabor v. The Metal Ware Corp., Nos. 05-4155
and 05-4156, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14793, at *2 (10th Cir. May 26, 2006).
97
See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
98
In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (Sup.
Ct. 2005). There are other examples of the fluidity of the different approaches. See,
e.g., Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 221-22 n.4 (Vt. 2005) (in a case to
collect a debt, recognizing that “[a]s they have evolved, there is little difference
between the de facto merger exception and the mere continuation exception. . . . We
view the name of the exception as unimportant.” (citations omitted)).
99
851 N.E.2d 1170 (N.Y. 2006).
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Semenetz involved an Alabama corporation selling an
allegedly defective and injury-causing sawmill to Semenetz
Lumber Mill, Inc.100 After the accident but before the plaintiff
commenced a products liability action, the Alabama
corporation sold most of its assets to a successor corporation
with an express waiver of all liabilities.101 The successor
corporation moved for summary judgment, asserting, among
other things, that successor liability should not apply.102 When
the motion eventually reached New York’s high court, it
declined to follow the line of lower New York cases supporting
the product line approach, and it rejected the doctrine.103
The court’s rejection of the product line approach was
based largely on apparent misperceptions. One is that the
product line approach threatens “economic annihilation for
small businesses [b]ecause [they] have limited assets.”104 In
reaching this conclusion, the court neglected to note that, as
addressed below, liability may be channeled back to the
predecessor corporation through a lower purchase price
discounted by the amount needed to purchase insurance
against foreseeable risks, and that insurance protection
appears to be readily available for successor liability
lawsuits.105
The court also cited the Restatement (Third)’s argument
that “adoption of the ‘product line’ exception would mark ‘a
radical change from existing law implicating complex economic
considerations best left to be addressed by the Legislature.’”106
This reasoning is misguided for several reasons. First, as
described in Redesigning Successor Liability, the Restatement
(Third) was simply wrong in its assertion that only a small
minority of jurisdictions follow one or both of the less
restrictive approaches.107 Rather, the number of jurisdictions
adopting one or both of the less restrictive approaches is in the
same ballpark as the number of jurisdictions following the
100

Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1171-72.
102
Id. at 1172.
103
Id.
104
Id. (quoting Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982)).
105
See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
106
Semenetz, 851 N.E.2d at 1175 (quoting City of New York v. Pfizer & Co.,
260 A.D.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. App. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 12 cmt. 6 & Reporters’ Note)).
107
See Cupp, supra note 17, at 852-58; see also supra notes 17-23 and
accompanying text.
101
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restrictive traditional approach.108 Thus, it is not a “radical
departure” to utilize the product line approach, and there
appears to be no evidence that the product line approach has
caused significant problems for small (or large) businesses in
California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Washington, or any of
the other often-sizable jurisdictions that utilize the approach.
Further, the leave-it-to-the-legislature argument, while
wise in many other contexts, represents particularly bad public
policy in this context. For more than thirty years legislatures
have failed to heed calls for effective and fair statutory
approaches to successor liability.109 A significant factor in the
failure of legislation is the “race to the bottom” motivation
inherent in potential successor liability laws. As noted in
Redesigning Successor Liability:
Unless almost all states enact effective legislation, corporate
managers determined to dissolve and to eliminate tort liability for
future products liability claims could simply reincorporate in
another state that does not provide effective protection for long-tail
claimants. They could then dissolve in the more business-friendly
state, avoiding future liability.
Individual states that enact
legislation adequately protecting victims of defective products would
risk chasing away businesses to other states. . . . The pressure to
race to the bottom to favor corporations might be even greater in
legislation not involving dissolution.110

Further, while the business community has effective lobbying
ability, “[t]he lobby for long-tail . . . claimants is exceedingly
weak.”111 The problem of an absence of successor liability, if
thought about at all, would likely appear technical and complex
to the average consumer, and thus potential defective product
victims are politically unlikely to clamor for fair laws.112
Finally, it is important to note that the traditional approach to
successor liability is a common law creation of the courts, not
the legislatures.113 Courts are less likely to intrude upon
legislative authority when reversing harmful public policy
consequences caused by their own common law creations.
Thus, New York’s rationale for its rejection of the
product line approach is questionable. It is worth noting again

108
109
110
111
112
113

See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
See Cupp, supra note 17, at 879-81.
Id. at 881-82 (citations omitted).
Green, supra note 11, at 59.
See Cupp, supra note 17, at 883.
See id. at 877-78.
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that the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the
continuity of enterprise approach will be adopted in New York,
because the plaintiff did not rely upon continuity of enterprise
in her appeal.114 However, based on its reasoning in rejecting
the product line approach, the future of continuity of enterprise
in New York is questionable as well.
In addition to New York, the Kentucky Supreme Court
refused to adopt the product line approach in 2002, but it did
not consider the continuity of enterprise approach.115 The next
year, the New Hampshire Supreme Court indicated that it
would not recognize the continuity of enterprise approach.116
Since 1999, only these courts have in published state appellate
or federal decisions considered and for the first time clearly
rejected either the product line or continuity of enterprise
approach in favor of the traditional approach to successor
liability in products liability cases.117 Of these states, Kentucky
was already considered by many—including the Restatement
(Third)118—to have rejected the less restrictive approaches
based on a 1987 Sixth Circuit opinion applying Kentucky law.119
The number of states that have for the first time clearly
adopted the product line or continuity of enterprise approach in
the new millennium is about the same as the number that have
adopted the traditional approach for the first time. Although
Professor Richard Epstein opposes the trend, he agrees that

114

Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 n.2 (N.Y.

115

Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Ky.

2006).
2002).
116
Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 568-69 (N.H.
2003). The Bielagus case regarded debts owed on a promissory note, but the court
noted that the continuity of enterprise approach would not apply in tort (including
products liability) or contract cases. See id.
117
In 2003, an Arizona appellate court declined to apply the continuity of
enterprise and product line approaches, but rather deferred to the state legislature to
determine whether the less restrictive approaches would become part of the fabric of
Arizona law. See Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1046-48 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003). In 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the traditional factors
in determining successor liability, but did not consider (and therefore did not reject) the
less restrictive approaches. See Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 215
(S.C. 2005); id. at 216-17 (Burnett, J., dissenting). Interestingly, South Carolina
passed a statute in 2006 limiting successor liability in asbestos litigation to the fair
market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the
merger or consolidation. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-81-140 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
118
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 cmt. c. (1997).
119
See Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987)
(applying Kentucky law).
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jurisdictions continue to adopt the less restrictive
approaches.120
An updated count of jurisdictions applying the different
approaches confirms that the judicial landscape remains
varied. As of mid-2006, nineteen states have clearly adopted
the traditional approach to determining successor products
liability.121 Twelve states have unequivocally adopted either
the continuity of enterprise and/or the product line approach.122
Five of these states follow the continuity of enterprise
approach.123 Six states follow the product line approach.124 One
120
Epstein, supra note 30, at 1168-69 (referring to “the [growing] minority of
cases that take one of two less restrictive positions on successor liability”); see also
Proof of Facts § 2, 46 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D (2004) (“[I]t appears that the
number of jurisdictions adopting an expanded version of the “mere continuation”
approach is increasing.”).
121
The count includes states that adopted the traditional approach through
either state supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or federal court decisions
attempting to apply state law. The count includes New Hampshire, even though the
pertinent case was not a products liability case, based on the court’s indicating it was
rejecting the continuity of enterprise approach even in products liability cases. That
being said, the nineteen states include Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F.
Supp. 619, 622-24 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)); Colorado (Johnston v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142-43, 1146-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)); Florida
(Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1982)); Illinois (Nilsson v.
Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Iowa (Pancratz v.
Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 199-202 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky (Conn, 835 F.2d at
146; Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Ky. 2002));
Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 1991)); Minnesota (Niccum v.
Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98-100 (Minn. 1989)); Missouri (Chem. Design, Inc.
v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)); Nebraska (Jones v.
Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Neb. 1982)); New Hampshire
(Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 568-69 (rejecting continuity of enterprise), Simoneau v. S. Bend
Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 407 (N.H. 1988) (rejecting product line approach)); North
Carolina (Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269-70 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988)); North Dakota (Downtowner Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121, 12425 (N.D. 1984)); Oklahoma (Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 69-71 (Okla.
1977)); Texas (Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986)); Vermont (Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984));
Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Davis
v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 562-63 (W. Va. 1992)); and Wisconsin (Fish v. Amsted
Indus., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823, 825 (Wis. 1985)).
122
Again, the count includes states that adopted the less restrictive
approaches through either state supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or
federal court decisions attempting to apply state law. For a listing of the states, see
infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
123
States following the continuity of enterprise approach include Alabama
(Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995)); Alaska (Savage Arms, Inc. v.
W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2001)); Michigan (Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976)); Ohio (Flaugher v. Cone Automatic
Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987)); and South Carolina (Holloway v. John E.
Smith’s Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying South Carolina law)).
124
States following the product line approach include California (Ray v. Alad
Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc. 431 A.2d
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state now follows both the continuity of enterprise and product
line approaches.125
II.

ANALYZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY IN CHANNELING RESPONSIBILITY BACK TO THE
MANUFACTURER

A.

Channeling Responsibility: The Less Restrictive
Approaches

The continuing use of the less restrictive approaches
serves the interests of corrective justice and public policy.
Redesigning Successor Liability posited that the continuity of
enterprise and product line approaches more effectively
channel responsibility for products liability back to the
predecessor corporation than does the traditional approach.126
The article asserted that the less restrictive approaches do so
by forcing successor corporations to consider the projected cost
of the predecessor’s products liability at the time the successor
purchases the predecessor.127 If a successor corporation has
reason to believe it may sustain products liability costs related
to the predecessor’s product, it will offer less money in the
transaction and may use the savings to purchase appropriate
811, 817 (N.J. 1981)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50 (N.M.
1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981)); and Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 1984)).
Four separate Connecticut lower courts have applied the product line exception. See
Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL 608674, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1999); Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996
WL 469716, at *7, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck
Corp., No. CV 920510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995);
Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1992).
125
This state is Mississippi (Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388
(Miss. 2001) (product line); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th
Cir. 1985) (continuity of enterprise)). New York’s current status regarding continuity
of enterprise is unclear. As addressed above, it has clearly rejected the product line
approach. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. Its lower courts have made
mixed and inconsistent rulings on continuity of enterprise, and thus the status of the
doctrine is unclear. For examples of lower New York courts holding the successor
liable if it is selling the same product line sold by the predecessor or if it falls within
the continuity of enterprise approach, see McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 893910, 1992 WL 266923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food &
Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting continuity of
enterprise). However, as addressed above, Semenetz casts doubt on the future of
continuity of enterprise in New York even though it expressly declined to address the
issue under the facts before it. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
126
See Cupp, supra note 17, at 861, 863, 867, 895-96.
127
Id. at 861-63.
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insurance against potential successor liability. Thus, the
responsible predecessor will ultimately, and appropriately,
bear most of the cost.
The article further advocated that the less restrictive
approaches are fairer and more efficient than the traditional
approach because “[p]roduct consumers may be less able than
successor corporations to plan for the possibility of loss
following a predecessor’s dissolution and may have less ability
The potential
to protect themselves from such loss.”128
successor, on the other hand, “is [often] in as good or better a
position as the predecessor manufacturer to determine whether
products made by the predecessor are defective and will lead to
liability if the successor chooses to purchase the predecessor’s
assets.”129 Although Redesigning Successor Liability recognized
that allowing more successor liability through application of
the less restrictive approaches does place an additional burden
on successor corporations to pay for defective products that
they did not make or sell, “[t]he burden of successor liability is
mitigated by the existence of readily available and relatively
inexpensive insurance.”130
B.

The Counterarguments

In Imperfect Liability Regimes,131 Professor Richard
Epstein argued that the possibility that liability concerns
might scrub transactions is “overlooked in Professor Cupp’s
channeling argument.”132 In the 2002 article, Epstein asserted
that adopting the less restrictive approaches may lead
corporations, for financial reasons and to avoid risk, to
liquidate or sell off assets piecemeal rather than sell to
successors when the value of potential legal claims against a
corporation exceeds its market value.133 This, Epstein argued,
may result in a “relentless strategy of fragmentation [that will]
destroy the going concern value of the business.”134 It may also,
in Professor Epstein’s estimation, make it difficult for a future
plaintiff to locate the appropriate defendants, and tort
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 867.
Id. at 867-68.
Id. at 870.
Epstein, supra note 30.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
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claimants may often find it impossible to recover anything.135
On the other hand, removing successor liability, while also
limiting a tort claimant’s ability to recover, “at least preserves
the going concern value of the business.”136
Dismissing an argument that insurance could dissuade
liquidation or at least protect claimants in the event of
liquidation, Epstein cited to administration and foreseeability
issues.137 Epstein argued that in many cases buyers will not be
able “to estimate this long tail of the initial exposure,”138 and
that, in any event, it is not possible to adequately insure when
“neither buyers nor sellers of such businesses had any
awareness of the implicit products liability risk.”139 He cites
asbestos, DES, and lead paint as illustrations of situations
where the risk was originally unknowable.140 On the flip side,
companies would be engaging in “expensive transactions to
respond to a nonexistent risk.”141
Professor Reilly echoed Professor Epstein’s concerns
about unknowable risks in her 2003 article entitled Making
Sense of Successor Liability.142 Professor Reilly argued that
“Cupp’s model of the transferee as the least cost insurer of
creditors’ loss misses an important limitation on the
transferee’s capacity to channel or internalize creditors’ risk of
loss to the debtor.”143 She asserted that Redesigning Successor
Liability’s channeling-back argument for imposing the less
restrictive approaches to successor liability “does not consider
the hard case where neither the transferor nor transferee could
have known either the magnitude or the probability of loss
from future claims against the transferor.”144 On the insurance
point, Professor Reilly argues that unknowable risks are “by

135

Id.
Id.
137
Epstein, supra note 30, at 1171-73.
138
Id. at 1172-73.
139
Id. at 1173.
140
Id. at 1172-73 (“The one point that is clear about each and every one of
these transactions [lead pigment, asbestos, DES] is that neither buyers nor sellers of
such businesses had any awareness of the implicit products liability risk at the time
these early corporate transactions took place.”).
141
Id. at 1172.
142
Reilly, supra note 31, at 783-84.
143
Id. at 790.
144
Id.
136
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definition” not insurable, and there is therefore no incentive to
internalize loss.145
C.

A Response: Killing Again the Ghost of Imputed Liability
for Unforeseeable Risks

Professor Epstein’s and Professor Reilly’s critiques of
the less restrictive approaches fail to consider how courts
address products liability claims involving truly unforeseeable
risks. Their concern that the less restrictive approaches to
successor liability will in many cases unfairly saddle
corporations with liability that was unforeseeable at the time
assets were transferred seems to rely at least in part on a
misguided assumption—that courts generally are willing to
impute knowledge of risks where those risks were not
reasonably knowable at the time of manufacture or sale. To
the contrary, courts typically refuse to assign liability based on
imputed knowledge in products liability cases.146 Rather, most
courts will only allow liability where the seller (i.e., the
predecessor corporation) knew or should have known of the
145
Id. Reilly also argues a fraud-based theory that “judicial rhetoric that
elevates continuity as a fraud-free justification for successor liability is the risk of
unpredictable, and potentially huge, transferee liability.” Id. at 791. Although “huge”
transferee liability may in fact occur, the size of the verdict in and of itself does not
make the invocation of the less restrictive approaches unfair, particularly when one
considers that the transferee corporation will be able to withstand a large verdict
better than an individual products liability plaintiff can withstand a tragic injury with
no recourse. As for the argument that the liability will be unpredictable, there is no
indication that history demonstrates any more unpredictability in these cases than in
those where fraud-based or other traditional approaches have been applied.
146
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1997)
(“Recognizing the convergence of the theories of negligence and strict liability in design
cases, the commentators have argued that, for strict liability to be of any consequence
in such cases, knowledge of risks that were unknowable at the time of marketing
should be imputed to manufacturers. This, however, the courts have consistently failed
to do.” (quoting 4 FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 109-10 (1977))); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810
P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991) (“[W]e hereby adopt the requirement, as propounded by the
Restatement Second of Torts and acknowledged by the lower courts of this state and the
majority of jurisdictions, that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict
liability for failure to warn.”); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988)
(“[L]iability is conditioned on the actual or constructive knowledge of the risk by the
manufacturer as of the time the product was sold or distributed.”); Olson v. Prosoco,
Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) (“[W]e have refused in the past to impose a duty
upon manufacturers to warn of unknowable dangers.”); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479
A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (“Similarly, as to warnings, generally conduct should be
measured by knowledge at the time the manufacturer distributed the product. Did the
defendant know, or should he have known, of the danger, given the scientific,
technological, and other information available when the product was distributed; or, in
other words, did he have actual or constructive knowledge of the danger?”).
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product’s risks when the product was sold.147 This is true
whether the claims are based on design defect or failure to
warn—in manufacturing flaw cases, knowledge of risks is of
limited relevance under strict liability, and in any event the
scope of liability for manufacturing defects tends to be
significantly narrower than that of design and warning claims
since manufacturing defect claims typically involve only a sole
defective product rather than an entire product line.148 As
recently noted by Professor David Owen, “The ghost of the
Wade-Keeton test [an often-used title for the practice of
imposing liability for unknowable risks] continues to haunt
judicial halls, but its time has come and gone.”149
The Restatement (Third) recognizes and strongly
supports the judicial rejection of imposing responsibility for
unknowable risks: “Although there is language in some cases
which appears to indicate a leaning toward imputation of
knowledge of unknowable risks upon the manufacturer, the
overwhelming majority of courts have evaluated the product on
the basis of what dangers could have been known at the time of
marketing.”150 The Restatement (Third) concludes: “Given the
criticism that has been leveled against the imputation of
knowledge doctrine and the relatively thin judicial support for
it, it is here rejected as a doctrinal matter.”151
The Restatement (Third)’s rejection of imputing
knowledge of unknowable risks reflects the views of numerous
scholars. Several writers have debunked the idea that courts
typically do or should apply liability where risks are
unforeseeable at the time of sale.152 Even the scholars who
147

See supra note 146.
Id.
149
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 534 (2005).
150
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1997) (also
recognizing that the doctrine of imputed knowledge “has not worn well with time” and
has “little support” where it “significantly affects defendants’ liabilities”).
151
Id.
152
See, e.g., 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 500 (3d ed. 2000) (“At least one state legislature has abolished the judicial
adoption of the Wade-Keeton test, and one wonders at its staying power around the
nation. Although the ghost of the Wade-Keeton test continues to haunt judicial halls,
its time has come and gone.”); DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY
545 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY] (“As the notion of true
‘strict’ products liability has been sliding into disfavor in design and warnings cases in
recent years, the Wade-Keeton test has declined as well.”); Michael D. Green,
Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1632 (1997) (“Keeton’s
advocacy for imputed knowledge had its apogee in 1982 when the New Jersey Supreme
Court accepted it in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., but it retains little
vitality today.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
148
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initially proposed the concept of imputed knowledge, Deans
John Wade and Page Keeton,153 later in their careers disavowed
the oft-criticized and seldom-applied doctrine.154 Dean Wade, in
particular, emphasized that he did not intend the “assumedknowledge” language to be taken completely literally: “Indeed,
I now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any
particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language. . . .
It always had overtones of fiction, and, like all fictions, it can
create difficulties if taken literally.”155
The trend away from imputed knowledge appears to be
well-grounded. Strict liability was not created as a means of
imposing absolute liability, and imputing knowledge of
unknowable risks often leads to results at or near the line of
absolute liability.156 This is particularly true in failure to warn
cases, where warnings are generally quite inexpensive to
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 274
(1990) (“If we assume, under the fairness view, that a basic postulate of legal duty is
that the conduct the law seeks to induce is capable of being performed and, as a
corollary, that the law eschews imposing duties to perform impossible tasks, then
imposing liability for failure to warn of unknowable risks is grossly unfair. . . . A rule
that penalizes longevity and contradicts fundamental rules of risk spreading by asking
the impossible of manufacturers is counterproductive and likely headed for oblivion.”);
Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting
the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 607 (1985) (concluding
that most courts claiming to apply strict products liability “are not prepared to impose
liability for information that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen at the
time of distribution”); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict
Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1206 n.76 (1992)
(discussing courts’ refusal to impose upon manufacturers knowledge of all dangers in
product, whether they were unknowable at time of marketing or not); Charles C.
Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as
Dependent on Defendant’s Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368 §2 (1984) (“Often
citing [RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 40A cmt. j], the courts for the most part, in
jurisdictions generally espousing the doctrine of strict products liability (when a
negligence theory is applied, there is no question that actual or constructive knowledge
is an essential element), hold that liability based upon a failure to warn users of a
product’s inherently dangerous quality or characteristic may be imposed only where
the manufacturer, distributor, or seller, as the case may be, had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous quality or characteristic.”).
153
See Page Keeton, Products Liability—Some Observations About Allocation
of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1966); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973).
154
See Keeton, supra note 34, at 595 (stating that “a product’s design should
normally be measured in terms of whether or not it was feasible to do a better job in
the light of the technology that was available at the time” of manufacture); Wade,
supra note 34, at 764 (stating that the value of the imputed knowledge doctrine “was in
explaining the concept of strict liability when it was new by clearly contrasting it with
negligence in which the defendant’s actual culpability in failing to learn of the
dangerousness of the product had to be shown”).
155
Wade, supra note 34, at 764.
156
See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of “Super Strict Liability”:
Common Sense Returns to Tort Law, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (1991).

1202

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4

provide.157 As one commentator has recognized, “[i]t is poor
public policy to demand that product manufacturers make their
products safer than is technologically possible, or demand that
manufacturers warn of unknowable risks. Such ‘super strict
liability’ discourages manufacturers from developing and
marketing new products, thereby depriving consumers of
desirable goods.”158 Additionally, scholars have noted the
inherent inequities in a system founded on requiring
performance of impossible duties.159
Further, clearly unknowable risks are relatively rare.160
This is in part due to the standard courts apply in holding
manufacturers to the knowledge of experts in the field.161 In
that capacity, “manufacturers must keep abreast of scientific
knowledge, discoveries, and advances, and are presumed to
know what is imparted thereby.”162 What the manufacturer
actually knew is not the issue, but rather what the
manufacturer could have discovered by fulfilling its obligations
as an expert.163 Under this standard, sellers generally are

157

See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products
Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 888 (2002).
158
See Schwartz, supra note 156, at 180.
159
See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 152, at 274 (“If we assume,
under the fairness view, that a basic postulate of legal duty is that the conduct the law
seeks to induce is capable of being performed and, as a corollary, that the law eschews
imposing duties to perform impossible tasks, then imposing liability for failure to warn
of unknowable risks is grossly unfair. . . . A rule that penalizes longevity and
contradicts fundamental rules of risk spreading by asking the impossible of
manufacturers is counterproductive and likely headed for oblivion.”).
160
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m, Reporters’
Note (1997) (quoting 4 FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 109-10 (1977)); see also Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit:
Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability
Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 898 (2005) (recognizing that the “original tests
for defect did not deal explicitly with the problem presented by liability for dangers
that were unknowable at the time the product was manufactured”).
161
See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984)
(“Further, a manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in the field.”).
162
63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1140 (2004); see also Klem v. E.I.
Dupont De Nemours Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1994); George v. Celotex Corp.,
914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1990).
163
See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Borel holds all manufacturers to the knowledge and skill of an expert. They are
obliged to keep abreast of any scientific discoveries and are presumed to know the
results of all such advances. Moreover, they each bear the duty to fully test their
products to uncover all scientifically discoverable dangers before the products are
sold.”); see also Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal.
1991) (“[T]he manufacturer is liable if it failed to give warning of dangers that were
known to the scientific community at the time it manufactured or distributed the
product.”).
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accountable for risks associated with their products even
without applying an imputed knowledge approach.
Asbestos litigation—relied upon by Professor Epstein in
his critique of the less restrictive approaches as an example of
a potentially unknowable risk164—in actuality provides an
illustration of the rarity of clearly unknowable risks. Many
experts and courts now agree that the asbestos industry was in
fact aware of the risks well before they stopped marketing the
product.165 This fits the too-familiar practice of manufacturers
asserting that they were not aware of a risk, but being found by
courts to have in fact known about it, or that they should have
known about it.166
Professor Epstein also cites DES and lead paint as
examples of cases where successor liability possibly could not
be factored into a business sale price due to unknowable
risks.167 However, as with asbestos litigation, in these cases,
plaintiffs generally have only been allowed to go forward when
courts have found that the manufacturer knew or should have
known of the risk.168 Again, courts have generally rejected the
164

See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1165-66.
See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 848, 856 (Tex. App. 2002)
(holding that decedent’s estate was entitled to exemplary damages because “evidence
was raised that Brown & Root had subjective knowledge of the risks associated with
asbestos but acted with conscious indifference to the rights of the workers at Lone Star
Steel” during the period of 1977-1985); see also Dartez, 765 F.2d at 461 (“If the dangers
of asbestos were known to Johns-Manville at the time of Dartez’s exposure, then the
same risks were scientifically discoverable by other asbestos corporations. Therefore,
the testimony of the medical director of the industry’s largest member is relevant to
plaintiff’s attempt to meet the evidentiary burden defined by Borel.”).
166
Cigarette industry executives’ 1994 testimony before Congress that
nicotine is not addictive provides a particularly egregious illustration. See Nearly 50
Years of Conflict Over Role of Smoking in Health, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 15, 2000,
at 6A.
167
See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1165.
168
See, e.g., McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1985)
(DES case: “Under Illinois precedent, to prevail on a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff
must show ‘that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger presented
by the use or consumption of the product’ and that the manufacturer did not warn of
the product’s ‘dangerous propensities.’”) (citation omitted); Brown v. Superior Court,
751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988) (DES case: “Thus, we disagree with plaintiff’s assertion
that defendants should be held liable for failing to warn the physician who prescribed
DES to plaintiff’s mother of alleged defects in the drug that were neither known by
defendants nor scientifically knowable at the time the drug was distributed.”); Grover
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ohio 1992) (DES case: “The manufacturer does
not breach its duty to warn—in negligence, in strict liability for breach of warranty, or
in strict liability in tort—until the company knew or should have known of a particular
risk through the exercise of ordinary care.”). Cf. David P. Swenson, “Market Share
Recovery for Risk” as a Preemptive Remedy for Childhood Lead Poisoning, 11 LAW &
INEQ. 585, 592 (1993) (“Property owners who sue paint manufacturers must prove the
manufacturers knew or should have known of the danger inherent in lead paint used in
165
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imputed knowledge approach in cases where risks were truly
unknowable.169 And in the DES and lead paint cases, again
similar to asbestos litigation and indeed most claims of
unknowable risks, imputed knowledge may not even be needed,
as arguments now exist that the manufacturers in fact knew or
should have known of the risks inherent in those products
when sales were being made.170 Asbestos, DES, and lead paint
cases help to disprove the notion that cases are generally
proceeding despite the unforeseeability of risks. Rather, in
most instances, judgments are only permitted or upheld when
courts find that the product risks involved were at least
reasonably knowable.
An argument may be asserted that even if
manufacturers need to have been aware of some level of
product danger to be liable, perhaps they may not have been
aware of the amount of money that would have to spend in
litigation, settlements, and judgments associated with the
product risk they knew or should have known about.171
However, this amounts to a criticism of tort law in general
rather than a specific criticism of successor liability.
Manufacturers of defective products, and indeed all tort
defendants, are liable to all foreseeable plaintiffs for all
foreseeable harm caused by their tortious acts or failures to
act.172 Challenges in knowing just how much the damages will
residences and that by continuing to market lead paint they breached a duty to
foreseeable victims.”).
169
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
170
See, e.g., McMahon, 774 F.2d at 835-36 (“There was sufficient evidence
from which a jury could reasonably have found that in 1955 Lilly knew or should have
known that DES might cause reproductive abnormalities, such as prematurity, in the
female offspring of women exposed to DES during pregnancy.”); Grover, 591 N.E.2d at
702, 703 (Resnick, J., dissenting) (“In light of the foregoing there can be no question
that pharmaceutical companies should have known the dangers of this drug. If in the
1930s and 1940s the manufacturers of DES knew or should have known of the
reproductive system defects in the animal fetus exposed to DES, how then is it not
foreseeable that this might mean abnormalities in the human fetus’ reproductive
system? In other words, it would appear that DES manufacturers knew or should have
known that the human fetus exposed in utero might have a defect in the female
reproductive system. Additionally, is it not then foreseeable that that female fetus
would at some point seek to employ the defective reproductive system? The answer
must be a resounding ‘yes.’”); Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 558 (Wis. 2005)
(discussing in depth the scientific documentation of the risks of lead poisoning and
concluding that “[m]any of the individual defendants or their predecessors-in-interest
did more than simply contribute to a risk; they knew of the harm white lead carbonate
pigments caused and continued production and promotion of the pigment
notwithstanding that knowledge”).
171
See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1170.
172
See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

2007]

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

1205

total are not a novelty reserved for successor liability claims,
and criticism based on such challenges is not persuasive. If
tort liability were only allowed in personal injury cases where
the amount of potential damages is clearly knowable, very few
personal injury cases would ever be permitted. Further, “[i]n
back of the tort system is an insurance system,” and insurance
actuaries routinely factor in potential liability variables when
setting tort insurance rates.173 Indeed, for the relatively brief
times when liability insurance “crises” were widely heralded,
arguments have been made that the problems related more to
unwise pricing practices by the insurance industry than to an
unpredictable tort system.174
In addition to addressing unforeseeability of risks,
Professor Epstein also raises the hypothetical situation where
new theories of liability arise, and the seller is not able to
However, that type of
predict that they would arise.175
situation would be quite rare—efforts at new causes of action
impacting large numbers of products cases do not succeed very
often in products liability’s maturing landscape (described by
Professor Owen as the “graying” of products liability).176
Indeed, Epstein’s primary example—the novel use of public
nuisance theories for gun liability177—does not appear to be
catching on in the courts. With limited exception, courts are
unwilling to impose liability on gun manufacturers for public
The courts recognize that doing so would
nuisance.178
173
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER,
WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 2 (11th ed. 2005).
174
See PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 152, at 1093-96.
175
Epstein, supra note 30, at 1172-73.
176
See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
177
See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1173.
178
See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability
Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 764 (2003) (“To date, litigation against gun manufacturers
has yielded the vast majority of legal opinions addressing the legal viability of the
public nuisance theory of recovery in the context of mass products liability. In most
cases, courts dismiss these public nuisance claims . . . .”); see also Frank J. Vandall, A
Preliminary Consideration of Issues Raised in the Firearms Sellers Immunity Bill, 38
AKRON L. REV. 113, 117 (2005) (“Strict liability and negligent design, as well as public
nuisance and fraud claims, have been rejected. The recent victories by the gun
manufacturers in both design defect and damage to cities, suggest that widespread
immunity is unnecessary at this time.”). Some of the cases rejecting public nuisance
claims against gun manufacturers include: District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting public nuisance claims against gun
manufacturers and distributors); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying New Jersey law); Tioga Pub. Sch.
Dist. #15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying North Dakota
law); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 909 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (applying Pennsylvania law) (“One way in which the role of public nuisance law
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improperly “loosen the tort from the traditional moorings of
duty, proximate causation, foreseeability, and remoteness.”179
Further, when courts do not dismiss nuisance cases
against gun manufacturers at the pleading stages, some of
those cases do not even involve products liability claims.
Rather, the allegations may be for “affirmative conduct on the
part of manufacturers and distributors that fosters an illegal
secondary gun market that interfered with the public right to
safety”180—claims involving risks most would agree are not
unknowable, since they allege affirmative misconduct. And
even courts that allow public nuisance claims based on
products liability-like allegations to proceed beyond the
pleading stages still require or at least recognize proof of
foreseeability.181
The resistance to public lawsuits against gun
manufacturers, however, is simply one example of a developing
trend to limit products liability. Change in products liability
law has been slowing down, and the spirit of radical expansion
has been replaced with a more middle-of-the-road mentality.182
The recent expansion of asbestos liability raised as a possible
rejoinder to this point by Professor Epstein has not been so
much an expansion of legal theory by courts as an expansion of
targeted defendants by plaintiffs’ lawyers, with the targeting
based on stream-of-distribution liability rules that predate the
cessation of asbestos sales, and the rules of joint and several

has been restricted is the refusal to apply the tort in the context of injuries caused by
defective product design and distribution.”); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
179
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d at 646.
180
See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211 n.26 (9th Cir. 2003)
(applying California law) (“Plaintiff’s nuisance claim, however, is not about the
manufacture or distribution of a defective or properly functioning product. Notably,
plaintiffs do not allege a product defect but rather allege affirmative conduct [such as
oversaturation of the market] on the part of manufacturers and distributors that
fosters an illegal secondary gun market that interfered with the public right to
safety.”).
181
See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 830 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (applying Ohio law) (“Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims will likely rise or fall with their
negligence claims.”); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio
2002) (municipality stated a claim for public nuisance against gun manufacturer when
“the complaint clearly alleged both intentional and negligent misconduct on appellees’
part. For example, Paragraph 119 of the complaint alleged that defendants
‘intentionally and recklessly market, distribute and sell handguns that defendants
know, or reasonably should know, will be obtained by persons with criminal
purposes.’”).
182
See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1173.
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liability that are much older yet.183 This is not at all an
argument that the expansion of asbestos liability is societally
beneficial or appropriate (indeed, one of this article’s authors
has been and remains strongly critical of the expansion),184 but
rather that current cases are based primarily on legal doctrines
that existed when many or most of the product sales currently
at issue in asbestos litigation took place.
Professor David Owen describes the slowing down of
products liability evolution in The Graying of Products
Liability:
In recent years, however, the law in this area has been evolving
more toward middle ground and compromise, away from the starker
approaches of its youth. The evolution of products liability law,
mirrored in the new Restatement, thus may be viewed as a
progression from the blacks and whites of early years to a modern
blend of boring grays—‘reasonable,’ perhaps, from a variety of
perspectives, but devoid of the lively clash of claims of right and
wrong that marked the early years.185

For better or worse, in most areas of products liability, courts
and legislatures are in general quite selective in expanding
substantive liability rules, further minimizing Professor
Epstein’s concern. Hypothetical and unlikely concerns that
doctrine may some day dramatically expand (with no evidence
of such doctrinal expansion on the horizon) should not derail an
approach to liability that provides the most desirable results in
real cases.
Analyzing whether the sky will fall if courts adopt the
less restrictive approaches to successor liability does not
require hypothesizing. As discussed above, one or more of the
less restrictive approaches are in effect in several large
states.186 If the approaches were to cause the sky to fall, it
should already be doing so in California and in many other
parts of the nation. Significantly, little if any evidence exists of
any outcry that the less restrictive successor liability rules are
actually causing dissolutions or piecemeal asset sales.187 To the
183

See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr. Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A
Case Study for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint & Several Liability, 31 PEPP.
L. REV. 203 (2003).
184
Id.
185
David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and
Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1994).
186
See supra notes 35-125 and accompanying text.
187
Cf. Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56 (Alaska 2001)
(“But we have not been referred to any evidence that adopting this modern ‘continuity
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contrary, some advisors have even counseled companies to seek
to prevent predecessor corporation dissolutions as a way of
avoiding successor liability, at least under the merger and
Thus, the
consolidation theories of successor liability.188
situation “on the ground” seems to be another practical
endorsement of the less restrictive approaches. A ready
insurance market is presently covering successor liability
claims, providing protection to successor corporations
concerned about inheriting liability.189 According to an expert
in the field, businesses purchasing predecessor corporations or
product lines presenting the greatest risks of products liability
are, appropriately, the most likely to invest in successor
products liability insurance.190
III.

CONCLUSION

Courts’ struggle over whether to apply the traditional
approach or one of the less restrictive approaches to successor
liability is ongoing. Cases in recent years have demonstrated
that the less restrictive approaches are continuing to find new
jurisdictional homes, and are neither dead to growth nor the
subject of overwhelming judicial rejection as asserted by the
However, other recent decisions
Restatement (Third).191
rejecting one or more of the less restrictive approaches show
of enterprise’ exception (or the marginally more popular ‘product line’ exception) has in
fact increased the number of corporate liquidations or piecemeal breakups, or that
rejecting the modern exceptions has in fact decreased liquidations or piecemeal sales.”);
Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 221-22 (S.C. 2005) (Burnett, J.,
dissenting) (“I reject as speculative and unfounded the argument that holding a
successor liable in a product liability action will damage business interests or prompt
rash decisions by corporations. Terex has not cited, nor have I found, any studies or
evidence demonstrating that the view I propose would inhibit asset-based transactions,
lead to increased piecemeal sales, or discourage large-scale transfers. Potential legal
liability often is a factor every responsible corporation must consider; however, it is not
the driving or primary force behind every decision. Successors contracting for an asset
transfer in a free market, when they intend to continue the basic enterprise, will
negotiate a price which reflects the fair market value of the transfer, taking heed of the
risk of future claims.”).
188
Robert M. Folger & Rob Witwer, Buying, Selling, and Combining
Businesses Under the Colorado Business Corporation Act, 33 COLO. LAW. 73, 77 (Nov.
2004) (“Acquirers seeking to avoid successor liability may wish to take steps (through a
covenant or other binding obligation) to prevent the immediate post-sale dissolution of
the Seller.”).
189
Telephone interview with Jeff Brown, Credit Union Project Manager, The
Chubb Corporation, in Warren, N.J. (July 26, 2006).
190
Id.
191
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 cmt. b, Reporters’ Note
(1997).
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that none of the approaches—traditional or less restrictive—
are on the verge of achieving dominance.
Although none of the approaches are currently
dominant, the less restrictive approaches are better. Someone
has to lose when an innocent consumer is injured by a defective
product and only an innocent successor corporation is available
as a defendant. The difference between the innocent consumer
and the innocent successor corporation is that the successor
corporation has a means by which to protect itself and channel
responsibility back to the responsible predecessor corporation
through a discounted purchase price if the less restrictive
approaches are applied. Under the traditional approach, the
consumer—the only party with no realistic options for shifting
responsibility to the party that caused the harm—generally
bears the entire loss alone.
Recent academic criticisms that the less restrictive
approaches unfairly saddle successor businesses with
unforeseeable risks ring hollow, as courts, supported by the
mainstream of scholars, reject applying even strict liability
when risks are truly unforeseeable (which are in any event
unusual situations). Calls to abandon improvements to the
court-made traditional approach to the legislatures are
unconvincing in light of more than thirty years of legislative
failure to enact meaningful reform. Legislatures’ race-to-thebottom incentive to leave consumers unprotected in product
defect cases involving successor corporations, along with the
lack of an effective consumer lobby to address issues that are
decidedly unfriendly to sound-bite politics, leave no reason to
expect that effective legislative reform is anywhere on the
horizon. The less restrictive approaches best serve corrective
justice and public policy; courts engaged in the ongoing judicial
redesign of successor liability should embrace them.

